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Introduction
Population aging presents enormous challenges for public pension systems (OECD, 2015) . Most OECD countries answered the challenges posed by increasing old-age dependency ratios by reforming their pension systems. A central aim of these reforms is to extend working lives alleviating the decline of the working age population (OECD, 2006 (OECD, , 2011 . Reforms include increases in the early retirement age (ERA) and increases in the normal retirement age (NRA), i.e. the age at which people can rst draw full benets without actuarial deductions. Germany is characterized by a particularly steep increase in the old-age dependency ratio and low employment rates of older workers. In order to relieve public nances by increasing the employment rates of older workers, in a 1999 pension reform, Germany abolished an important early retirement program for women born after 1951. The reform eectively raised the ERA for women from age 60 to at least 63. An increase in the retirement age has the potential to extend contribution periods and reduce the number of pension beneciaries at the same time, if employment exits are successfully delayed. However, workers may not be able to work longer or may choose other social support programs as exit routes from employment. Large program substitution eects could undermine the potential positive scal eects of the pension reform. Therefore, it is important to empirically assess if an increase in the ERA induces increased inactivity or substitution into other government programs such as unemployment or disability benets.
In this paper, we provide novel empirical evidence on this important research question. In more detail, we analyze the labor market eects of the substantial increase in the early retirement age for women. The change in ERA is a large negative wealth shocks for the aected cohorts. The reform provides a clean quasi-experimental setting as it induces a large one-time shift in the ERA. We exploit the unprecedented sharp discontinuity in the ERA between cohorts to estimate the causal impact on female employment behavior in a regression discontinuity framework based on high quality administrative data. We know the month of birth and compare women born close to the cuto. Our research design allows us to quantify the causal eects of the reform on female employment, take-up of disability pensions, unemployment, and inactivity rates. Furthermore, we focus not only on the eects on levels, but also on employment outows into other social security programs as a response to the reform. In contrast to most of the previous literature, we distinguish between active program substitution from employment into unemployment, disability pension or inactivity, and passive program substitution, which occurs due to continuance of the former status because an exit into early retirement is no longer attainable. Furthermore, we examine whether the behavioral reactions are heterogeneous across dierent groups. Raising the ERA might have undesired distributional eects as the ability to work longer and the remaining life expectancy may depend on socio-economic status. In particular, workers with poor health and a weak labor market position might be negatively aected by the reduced retirement options (Staubli, 2011) .
We contribute to the literature in various ways. Similar to other studies, we exploit cohort-specic variation in incentives to retire (e.g., Mastrobuoni, 2009; Hanel and Riphahn, 2012; Cribb et al., 2014; Lalive and Staubli, 2014; Atalay and Barrett, 2015; Manoli and Weber, 2016; Engels et al., 2016) . In contrast to previous studies, the reform we analyze is a large one-time change of pension rules. Usually changes of the retirement age are introduced in small steps over a longer time horizon, which generally requires stronger assumptions to separate the reform eect from time trends, other policy reforms, and cohort eects. Moreover, many studies focus on changes in the NRA, while only a few analyze the eect of changes in the ERA. Increasing the ERA implies that the choice set of older workers is reduced and that the employment reaction of those who would have chosen to retire depends on the relative attractiveness of the remaining options. There is a large literature that analyzing program substitution eects in the context of pension reforms (e.g., Duggan et al., 2007; Karlström et al., 2008; Li and Maestas, 2008; Coe and Haverstick, 2010; Staubli, 2011; Staubli and Zweimüller, 2013; Borghans et al., 2014; Atalay and Barrett, 2015; Inderbitzin et al., 2016) . However, the existing evidence on the eectiveness of increasing the ERA and program substitution is mixed. Staubli and Zweimüller (2013) and Atalay and Barrett (2015) nd that gradual increases in the ERA led to increased program substitution in Austria and Australia. In contrast, Manoli and Weber (2016) and Oguzoglu et al. (2016) do not nd evidence for increased active substitution from employment into social security programs based on the same reforms.
Based on a linear regression-discontinuity design, we nd that employment rates of women born in 1952 aged 60 and older increased markedly by 14.4 percentage points due to the reform. Interestingly, employment rates before age 60 remained unaected by the reform, even though the reform was long anticipated. Although we nd evidence for increased program substitution into unemployment, the increase in the unemployment rate is not due to active program substitution from employment but rather stems from the inability of unemployed women to retire early after the reform. We do not nd evidence for increased unemployment, disability pension, or inactivity entry due to the ERA increase. Based on these results, we draw the following conclusions: First, the reform seems to be an eective tool to extend employment of employed women. Second, unemployed women remain longer in unemployment. Third, we do not nd evidence for increased take-up of disability pensions. Fourth, the results suggests that the reform aected certain groups heterogeneously. We nd larger positive eects on the employment rates of women with low income or poor health; however, the dierences are statistically insignicant. We also nd larger eects on unemployment rates in East Germany than in West Germany, which is consistent with the fact that unemployment rates were higher and early retirement was more prevalent in the East. Further heterogeneous eects of the reform result from the persistence of labor market statuses: Unemployed or inactive women remained in their respective status while employed women continued being employed. A tentative interpretation of these results is that the reform increased inequality within the aected cohorts.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briey outlines the pension system and the 1999 pension reform. Section 3 derives hypotheses about potential behavioral reactions. Section 4 describes the administrative data that are used in our analysis. Section 5 describes our empirical strategy and Section 6 presents the results of the empirical analysis, including a discussion of the heterogeneity of the results across subgroups. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Institutional background
In this section, we provide an overview of the German public pension system and its dierent early retirement programs. The 1999 pension reform, which this paper focuses on, is explained in detail. In addition, we discuss interactions of the pension system with other social security programs (unemployment and disability pensions) and highlight potential program substitution patterns.
The German public pension system
The statutory public pension system covers most private and public sector employees. It provides old-age pensions, disability pensions, and survivors benets. The system is nanced by a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) scheme. The calculation of pension benets is based on a point system that takes into account the entire earnings history and insurance record of each individual. A year's contribution at the average earnings of contributors earns one pension point. Moreover, pension points can be acquired during other insurance periods (e.g. unemployment, child raising and while providing informal care). Pensions are roughly proportional to an individual's average lifetime labor income and feature few redistributive properties. 1 Depending on the length of the insurance record and other qualifying conditions, the age at which pension benets can be claimed lies between 60 and 65.5 for the cohorts under study (19511952) . In addition to the regular pension, which requires 5 years of contributions, until 2012 there were four early retirement programs with dierent qualifying conditions:
1. Pension for women 2. Invalidity pension 3. Pension after unemployment or old-age part-time work
Pension for the long-term insured
The rst two of these programs allowed retirement starting from 60 years of age, the pension for women and the pension for people with severe disability status (invalidity pension). The NRA, the age at which full benets can be claimed, was dierent between these programs. The NRA of the pension for women and for the invalidity pension was 65 and 63, respectively. Early retirement was associated with actuarial deductions of 0.3% per month before the NRA. That is, retiring through the pension for women at age 60 is associated with permanent pension deductions of 18%. Deductions amount to 10.8% for people eligible for invalidity pensions. The other two early retirement programs allowed retirement starting from age 63. People who are not able to work due to severe health conditions can retire before the age of 60 through the disability pension program. See Table 4 for more details. 2
The 1999 pension reform
The 1999 reform abolished the early retirement program for women in cohorts born after 1951. Eectively, the reform raised the earliest retirement age for most women to at least 63. Women born before 1952 could claim the pension for women if they fullled certain qualifying conditions. The eligibility criteria were: (i) at least 15 years of pension insurance 1 Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2004) provide an extended overview of the German pension system. 2 Note that the German pension system provides two dierent types of pensions due to impaired health.
The disability pension ("Erwerbsminderungsrente") is similar to disability benets in the US. Eligibility for full benets requires that an individual is unable to work more than 3 hours a day for at least six months. Eligibility for partial disability benets require that the individual is unable to work more than 6 hours a day. Eligibility requires 5 years of contributions. It is the only pension that is available before the age of 60. In addition, there is a second type of old-age pension: the invalidity pension is available from age 60 for people with a severe disability status under German law. Invalidity status requires a degree of disability of 50% or more and does not require work incapacity. The ERA of this pension has been increased since 2012 (see Table 4 ).
contributions; (ii) at least 10 years of pension insurance contributions after the age of 40. These criteria ensured a minimum labor market attachment of eligible women. Our data show that about 60% of all women born in 1951 were eligible for the old-age pension for women. Take-up was particularly prevalent in East Germany, where most women have a strong labor market attachment and meet the qualifying conditions of this pension type. 3 Due to the reform, women born in 1952 lose an important option to exit the labor market before age 63. At age 63, people with a long insurance record can retire with deductions. As explained above, the only remaining pension type before age 63 is the invalidity pension. However, even before the 1999 reform, if women had the the choice between the invalidity pension or the pension for women, the former implied lower deductions. In other words, invalidity pension has always been advantageous compared to the pension for women. Therefore, we do not expect large substitution into the invalidity pension due to the reform. For women born after 1951 who want to exit the labor market before age 63, the remaining options are unemployment benets, disability pensions, or inactivity.
Disability pension, unemployment insurance and inactivity
It is theoretically plausible that some women who would have otherwise claimed old-age pension benets chose another social support program or withdrew from the labor force. In the following, we briey describe the design of unemployment insurance and disability pensions in Germany, focussing on the potential for interdependencies and program substitution.
Unemployment benets in Germany replace about 60% of previous net earnings and increase pension entitlements. 4 Eligibility and the entitlement period depend on the age and the previous working history. The maximum entitlement period for unemployment benets did not change during our observation period. Specically, the maximum entitlement period for individuals above the age of 57 was 24 months. Generally, there is a strong interdependence between unemployment benets and pensions for older individuals. As documented in Grogger and Wunsch (2012) , Giesecke and Kind (2013) and Engels et al. (2016) , some older individuals use unemployment benets as a bridge into retirement. In particular, there is evidence that unemployed individuals exhaust their full entitlement period for unemployment benets before entering retirement. The design of the institution provides strong incentives for this behavior; unemployment benets are relatively generous, periods in unemployment increase pension entitlements and, lastly, search requirements for unemployed persons close to retirement are very low. Therefore, an increase in the ERA is likely to aect the take-up of unemployment benets in two ways: rst, individuals have an increased incentive to postpone entry into unemployment, if unemployment benets are indeed used as a pathway to retirement. This would lead to a shift in increased unemployment entry from 58 (cohort 1951) to 61 (cohort 1952) years; 24 months before reaching the cohort-specic ERA. Second, unemployment rates among 60 to 63 year-old women may increase due to program substitution because of the abolishment of the early retirement option, i.e. because women who want to exit employment between the old and new ERA must take another path to exit the labor market.
The disability pension (Erwerbsminderungsrente) is the only pathway to retirement before reaching the ERA. Eligibility requires the long-term (at least six months) inability to perform an activity under normal labor market conditions for at least six hours (partial disability pension) or at least three hours (full disability pension) per day. The pension is calculated based on the previous insurance biography and amounts to the pension that would be paid had the individual continued to work until she turned 60. When reaching the statutory retirement age, the disability pension is converted into an old-age pension usually of the same level. In Germany, health-related eligibility criteria for disability pensions are relatively strict, especially sine a 2001 reform. About 40% of all applications are rejected. Therefore, using disability pensions as a pathway to a regular old-age pension is dicult and not typically an attractive option. Moreover, since 2001, actuarial deductions also apply to this type of pension. The pension is permanently reduced by 0.3% per month if retiring before the NRA. In 2012, the NRA of disability pensions was increased from 63 to 65, with deductions capped at a maximum of 10.8%. Virtually all of these pensions are reduced by maximum deductions since most people claim this pension before turning 60 (Deutsche Rentenversicherung, 2015, p.83) .
Individuals who are neither eligible for disability pension nor unemployment benets may choose inactivity, i.e. exit the labor force without benet receipt. This is particularly relevant for women, who often are not the primary earner in their households.
Expected reform eects
The reform of 1999 is expected to have several eects on employment outcomes. We expect women born after 1951 to extend employment and to delay retirement entry compared to women unaected by the reform. Since the reform did not just increase the penalty for early retirement but abolished the option altogether, we expect large eects on employment rates of wome aged 60 to 63. However, not all women are able or willing to work until reaching the new ERA. Therefore, we expect increased program substitution, which is the response to similar reforms in other countries (see Staubli and Zweimüller, 2013; Atalay and Barrett, 2015) .
Following Oguzoglu et al. (2016) , we distinguish between two dierent kinds of eects: active and passive (mechanic) program substitution. Women who do not have an option to retire at 60, even though they would have retired in the absence of the 1999 reform, must divert into another employment status or continue their previous status. The continuation in a social security program due to the lack of a retirement option can lead to a passive increase in e.g. unemployment and inactivity rates. In contrast, active program substitution refers to ows from employment into other social security programs as a response to the elimination of the retirement option. In order to distinguish between passive and active program substitution, we analyze employment outows into other social security programs around age 60. There are mainly the two aforementioned social security programs that are relevant in this context: unemployment insurance and disability pensions (explained in detail in Section 2.3). As a third option, we consider potential increases in inactivity rates.
There are several reasons why we expect the 1999 reform to eect employment outcomes before the former ERA of 60. First, women born after 1951 who have a preference for early retirement around the age of 60, may choose alternative pathways to exit employment, perhaps even before their 60 th birthday, instead of delaying until they reach the ERA. The ERA can serve as a reference age for retirement decisions (see Seibold, 2016) , which leads to the bunching of retirement entries at the ERA, and a reduced number of exits among individuals approaching the reference age. Consequently, an ERA increase may lead to an increase in employment exits of women approaching age 60. We refer to this eect as the reversed reference-age eect.
Second, women may bridge the last one or two years prior to reaching the ERA with unemployment. As explained in the previous section, German workers have an incentive to exit employment two years before reaching the ERA through unemployment benets, which are paid for up to 24 months to older workers. An increase in the ERA leads to a shift in the bridge period. If women adjust their employment behavior and delay their (bridge into) retirement, we expect a negative eect on unemployment and disability pension rates for women approaching age 60, in particular among 58 and 59 year-old women. Instead we would expect women born after 1951 to enter unemployment at 61 or 62 years of age more often.
Third, the ERA increase was announced in 1999, while it only aected women turning 60 in 2012. Consequently, the ERA increase was known when the rst aected cohort was 47 years old. It is not obvious a priori how younger women will adjust their labor supply in a response to the increased ERA. The reform can be interpreted as a strong negative wealth shock as it reduces the length of time that women receive pension benets. Theoretically, this should have a positive eect on labor supply. If these women were forward looking, they might have adjusted labor supply as soon as the legislation was passed. 5
Data
We use high-quality administrative data from public pension insurance accounts (VSKT: Versicherungskontenstichprobe). 6 VSKT is a stratied random sample of all pension insurance accounts of people aged 30 to 67. The VSKT is representative of the German population of public pension insurance accounts, if the appropriate sampling weights are used. Since the data are process-produced, recall errors due to memory gaps and wrong temporal assignment are avoided, while panel mortality is negligible (Fachinger and Himmelreicher, 2006) . The data include the month of birth of each individual which allows to compare women born close to the cuto. Furthermore, individual employment behavior and retirement entry is reported with monthly accuracy. A drawback is that socio-economic variables are only recorded to the extent that they are relevant for the calculation of pension benets. Consequently, information on education is missing in about half of the cases. Information about occupations is only available for the last occupation at the time of data collection, which may not be representative of entire employment histories. Furthermore, it is not possible to link spouses and other household members within the data. 7 For our analysis we use the VSKT of 2014, the latest available wave at the time of 5 We do not expect strong behavioral reactions to the changed incentives of the qualifying conditions. The eligibility criteria of the pension for women (namely after 15 years of pension contributions) are no longer relevant for cohorts born after 1951. However, early retirement at 63 requires the completion of a contribution period of 35 years, including child raising periods. It is not clear how the change in eligibility criteria for early retirement aects the labor supply of women between 47 and 59. For example, a woman in the 1951 cohort with 14 years of contributions has a strong incentive to work at least one additional year to qualify for early retirement. The incentive to accumulate 35 contribution years is higher for cohorts born after 1951. The data show a large overlap between women who fulll the criteria of the pension for women and those who fulll the eligibility criteria for early retirement for the long-term insured. A graphic representation of the distribution of pension contribution years is in Appendix C.3. As documented in Seibold (2016) bunching around these thresholds is present, but it is very small and In fact, the vast majority of women who qualied for the pension for women were also eligible for long-term insured pension. 6 We use the full VSKT, which is roughly four times as large as the scientic-use le SUFVSKT and can only be accessed on-site. 7 A detailed description of the data can be found in Himmelreicher and Stegmann (2008). analysis. We restrict the sample to women born 12 months before and after the cuto (cohorts 1951 and 1952) . Furthermore, we exclude all women who paid contributions to a special miners' pension scheme (Knappschaftliche Versicherung) for at least one month, which applies to about 10% of all women. Another group excluded from our sample (about 6% of all women) consists of all women receiving an old-age invalidity pension at some point in their life. 8 After dropping these groups, we are left with 7,365 women. 9 The 1999 pension reform increases the ERA only for women who were eligible for the pension for women. Women who did not meet the qualifying conditions, are mot likely to be eligible to any early retirement program. In our analysis, we therefore focus on women who fulll the eligibility criteria for the pension for women. 10 Those criteria are the accumulation of at least 15 years of pension contributions, with 10 years after turning 40. About 60% of the women in our sample fulll these eligibility criteria. Due to the traditionally stronger labor market attachment of women in East Germany, the share of eligible women amounts to more than 80% for East German women. Our nal sample consists of 3,771 women who fulll the eligibility criteria of the pension for women. About 30% of the eligible women in the sample (cohort 1951) retire early through the early pension for women before their 62 nd birthday.
The main variables of interest in this analysis are whether or not an individual is employed, unemployed, inactive, or receiving a disability pension at any given age in months. 11 A woman counts as employed if she had a job which was subject to social security contributions or if she was marginally employed. 12 The best approximation of inactivity is the residual category, which comprises all statuses that are not employment, unemployment, or pension receipt. The residual category includes periods of education or training, insured self-employment, non-commercial care for children or elderly family members, illness, and unknown status (missing value). By far the largest group within the residual category consists of women with missing employment status. We refer to the residual category as inactivity in the remainder of this paper. These women coule, in principle, be working as uninsured self-employed or as civil servants since these statuses are also recorded as missing values. However, this is very unlikely in the sample we select: women older than 58 who qualify for the pension for women. That is, women who paid 10 years social security contributions after their 40 th birthday. 13 In order to analyze heterogeneous eects by income and health, we use information on average pension points and periods of sick-pay to approximate income groups and health status. A women is dened to belong to the low income group if she is in the lowest third of the distribution of average pension points over all full contribution periods. 14 The low income group is dened by having accumulated on average less than 0.52 annual pension points. That is equivalent to 52% of average earnings or 18,126 euro for a West German woman in 2014. 15 Note that we use individual pension points, which are based on individual earnings. We approximated poor health using periods of sick-pay, which are only recorded if the sick leave exceeds six weeks or entails hospitalization for employed individuals. A person is dened as having a poor health status if she has at least one sick-pay spell between age 45 and 55, which holds true for about 26% of the sample of eligible women. 16
Descriptive evidence
The distribution of employment status by age group is displayed in Figure 1 for the 1951 and 1952 cohorts. The employment rates of 58 and 59 year-old women are relatively high due to the sample restriction to women eligible for the pension for women. It shows that a large fraction (26%) of women born in 1951 receive an old-age pension from their 60 th birthday onward. This fraction disappears if we look at the 1952 cohort, due to the ERA increase. Employment, unemployment, and inactivity rates increased for 60 and 61 yearold women born in 1952 (treatment group) compared to women born in 1951 (control group). In particular, the employment rate amounts to 70% in the cohort 1952, where it is 54% in the 1951 cohort. A closer look at the fractions of women in dierent employment status across age reveals that women born in 1951 exhibit a large drop in employment rates when reaching age 60, while this discontinuity is not observed for the 1952 cohort ( Figure 3a ). Not surprisingly, the fraction of women receiving a pension (including disability pensions) increases sharply at the ERA for the 1951 cohort ( Figure 3b ). There is no visible dierence in employment and retirement rates between cohorts before reaching age 60. Figure 5a and Figure 5b show that the fraction of women in marginal employment and the unemployment rate are slightly higher for the 1952 cohort for all ages between 55 and 60. At age 60 however, we observe a drop in marginal employment and unemployment rates of the 1951 cohort. From age 60 to 62, the 1952 cohort is more likely to be marginally employed and unemployed. It can be seen in Figure 5d that the fraction of inactive women also drops sharply when reaching age 60, indicating that a large share of women who were previously inactive start receiving the pension for women. The fraction of women receiving a disability pension increases continuously with age for both cohorts (Figure 5c ). It can also be observed that women born in 1951 are slightly more likely to receive a disability pension (Figure 5c ), in particular between 57 and 61 years of age. Note that dierences between cohorts and uctuations over time can be due to e.g. time trends or macroeconomic shocks. However, our empirical identication strategy is not threatened as long as dierences between cohorts are continuous over the month of birth (see Section 5 for a detailed description of our empirical strategy.)
While the sharp decrease in the proportion of women born in 1951 in several employment categories suggest an outow into early retirement, an analysis of employment outows is needed to gain further insights on employment exit behavior and potential program substitution eects. In particular, we cannot infer from Figure 4 whether the reform led to increased inow into unemployment, disability pension, or inactivity from employment.
Employment outows are displayed in Figure 7a to Figure 7d . The employment exit hazard rate is dened as the fraction of women exiting employment at age t, conditional on survival in employment (excluding marginal employment) up to age t, out of all women who were employed for at least six months when reaching age 58. Unemployment, disability pension, and inactivity entry rates are dened as the probabilities to enter the respective category conditional on having survived until t, and employment (including marginal employment) for at least six months at their 58 th birthday. Note that we do not condition on employment between age 58 and the rst unemployment, disability pension or inactivity entry event. We only consider the rst exit or entry, i.e. reentering the sample is not Figure 7a that the employment exit hazard peaks at age 60 (one month after the 60 th birthday) and, to a lesser extent, at age 61 for the 1951 cohort, while the hazard remains at for the 1952 cohort. If women in our sample used 24 months of unemployment benets receipt as a bridge to retirement, we would expect a peak in unemployment entry at age 58 for the 1951 cohort, and at age 61 for the 1952 cohort or at least higher entry rates in the two years before reaching the ERA. With respect to active program substitution due to the pension reform, we expect increased entry into unemployment and disability for the 1952 cohort at around age 60. However, neither are observed in Figure 7b . Therefore, it would be surprising if we discovered a large shift in unemployment entry or increased program substitution in the regression discontinuity analysis. The entry rates into disability pension and inactivity do not exhibit notable peaks, nor are there observable dierences between cohorts (Figure 7c and Figure 7d ).
These descriptive results suggest that there is not increased substitution from employment into unemployment, disability pension programs or inactivity due to the ERA increase. However, the hazard rates displayed here are descriptive only. At each age, the population that survives in employment is selective, based on previous hazard rates. Therefore, one cannot interpret the dierences in hazard rates between cohorts in a causal sense. A more rigorous empirical analysis, described in the following section, is necessary to assess whether the ERA increase led to extended employment and substitution into unemployment and disability pension programs or inactivity around the former ERA.
Empirical strategy
The empirical identication of the eect of pension eligibility rules on labor supply and retirement behavior is challenging: Employment histories and unobserved preferences for work and leisure aect both labor supply in old-age as well as eligibility for early retirement. One way to circumvent this endogeneity problem is to exploit exogenous variation in the pension system over time or cohorts due to policy changes. Our empirical strategy makes use of the 1999 pension reform, which eliminates the option to retire at age 60 for women born in 1952 and thereafter.
In the rst part of our empirical analysis, we employ a linear regression discontinuity research design to estimate the causal eect of an increase in the ERA on employment rates, unemployment rates, the fraction of older women receiving a disability pension, and the fraction of inactive women. The regression discontinuity design solves the endogeneity problem by exploiting variation in the ERA by month of birth. It is valid, if we innocuously assume that labor supply at a given age would be continuous over the month of birth in absence of the 1999 reform.
The research design is implemented by the following empirical model:
Where the indicator D i = 1, if the individual was born after January 1952. The subscript t refers to age in months and ranges from 721 to 744 (age 60 to 62 in monthly steps) in the baseline specication. The month of birth z i enters the empirical model in dierence to the reform cuto c, which is January 1952. In our baseline specications, we include a linear trend in the running variable, f (z i − c) = z i − c. The specication allows for dierent slopes before and after the cuto. All regressions include calendar month xed eects, and dummies for three income groups, children, and region, summarized in X it . However, dropping X it does not change the point estimates (see Appendix C.5 for regression results without covariates). Regression discontinuity analyses are naturally prone to model misspecication. A non-linearity in outcomes may falsely be interpreted as a discontinuity if it is unaccounted for. Therefore, we report linear regression results both with linear and quadratic trends in the running variable (RDD results with quadratic trends are displayed in Table 14 in Appendix C.6). Furthermore, we support our analysis by graphical analyses of local linear regression plots.
Employment status data is recorded for each individual at every age in months t. Therefore, we need to specify a time-window for the outcome variables of interest. In our baseline specication, we pool all observations from the month after the 58 th birthday to the 60 th birthday (age 58-59 ), and all observations from the month after the 60 th birthday to the 62 nd birthday (age 60-61 ). 17 In order to account for correlation between observations for the same individual or individuals born in the same month, we cluster standard errors by month of birth. The baseline specication allows us to estimate treatment eects for four outcome variables for two age groups before and after age 60. However, it may be of interest to estimate a more exible model that allows for heterogeneous eects for every age in months t. Consequently, we analyze the reform eects for every age in months separately by including age-treatment interactions into our empirical model. The inclusion of age-dummies and interactions with the treatment variable D i = 1, allows us to interpret the coecient of the interaction term as the reform eect on a specic age group (see Section 6.2).
In the second part of the empirical analysis, we focus on active program substitution due to the ERA reform (similar to Manoli and Weber (2016) or Oguzoglu et al. (2016) ). In more detail, using a sub-sample of women who were employed on their 58 th birthday, we estimate outows from employment, and inows into unemployment benets, disability pension, and inactivity (see Section 6.4). If we look at the eects on the shares in dierent employment categories only (as in Equation 1), we cannot distinguish between passive and active program substitution. In contrast, an analysis of employment outows allows us to answer the question whether women increasingly used alternative social security programs to exit employment in response to the abolishment of the early retirement option. 18 We circumvented the dynamic selection problem by conditioning on employment at a xed age in months. Formally, we estimate the same regression discontinuity model as described in Equation 1 ; however, the outcome of interest is the probability to exit employment (into unemployment or disability pension programs) within the following 2-4 years, conditional on employment for at least six months at the 58th birthday. Conditioning on employment at certain age is problematic if it is itself an outcome that is potentially aected by the reform. However, we can show that there is no discontinuity in the employment rate at the sample entry age of 58 (Figure 12 in Section 6.4). Consequently, we argue that treatment eects on ow variables can consistently be estimated using the linear RD approach described above.
Threats to identication
The RD design is only valid if women cannot manipulate the treatment assignment variable (Lee and Lemieux, 2010) , which is the month of birth in our research design. Evidently, it is impossible that women or their parents manipulated the date of birth in anticipation of the policy change, as the reform was introduced long after the cohorts in question were born. Furthermore, we are not aware of any discontinuous changes in the incentive to give birth in December 1951 as opposed to January 1952. 19 One of the most important assumptions of our analysis is that any discontinuities in the outcome variables at the cuto are solely due to the 1999 pension reform. In particular, we need to assume that the dierences between the cohorts in question are not caused by other policy changes. Two other pension policy changes also became eective for individuals born after January 1st, 1952. First, the old-age pension for the unemployed was abolished for all individuals born after 1951 as part of the 1999 pension reform. However, the ERA for this pension was already at 63. Therefore, this change did not aect women at age 60. Second, the ERA of the invalidity pension program was increased from 60 to 63 in monthly steps starting with individuals born in January 1952. We exclude all women who received an invalidity pension because the ERA for the invalidity pension was also changed for the same cohorts as for the pension for women. It can be assumed that women eligible for either pension will choose the invalidity pension due to the signicantly more generous pension benets.
Even in the absence of other reform changes, women born in 1952 may still be dierent from women born earlier due to time trends in employment outcomes. Employment rates of women have been increasing over the past decades for every age. Including linear or quadratic trends in birth-dates should resolve this issue in an RD research design, as long as we can assume that women who were born close to the cuto are not dierent from each other. This is tested by checking for discontinuities in covariates, using the same regression discontinuity framework. Results from the test for covariate discontinuities are displayed in Table 7 in Appendix C.1. We do not nd signicant discontinuities in covariates that are not inherently inuenced by the 1999 reform. Furthermore, we perform a dierencein-discontinuities analysis in order to test whether our results are caused by a turn of the year eect. Reassuringly, the results of the dierence-in-discontinuity analysis, displayed in Table 8 and Table 9 in Appendix C.2, do not dier signicantly from our baseline results.
A possible concern arises due to the selection of the sample by the eligibility criteria of the pension for women. Specically, women born in 1951 may select into the sample by extending their pension contribution period in order to be eligible for early retirement. In contrast, women born in 1952 do not have the same incentives to fulll the eligibility criteria. We discuss the problem of sample selectivity in Appendix C.3. We show that the potential bias due to selection is negligible because there was no change in the fraction fullling early retirement eligibility criteria due to the reform. We repeat the analysis without sample restrictions using all women born 1951 and 1952 regardless of pension eligibility criteria. We nd that the pattern of the reform eects is very similar when including the non-eligible women yet eects are at a lower level. The results are in Appendix C.4.
Results

Baseline results
The results of the linear regression discontinuity analysis are displayed in Table 1 . Figure 9a to 9d visualize the results using local linear regression on both sides of the cuto, a triangular kernel, and a bandwidth of 12 months.
The increase in the ERA had an average positive eect of 14.4 percentage points on the employment rate of 60 and 61 year-old women (see Column 1, Table 1 ). The coecients can be interpreted as the average percentage point change in employment rates of all women in this age group due to the pension reform. Compared to the pre-reform mean the relative increase amounts to more than 26%. The fraction of women receiving a pension mechanically dropped by 25 percentage points to zero (Column 5). About 58% of those women, who would have retired if they had the option, continue to work due to the reform. The remaining women split equally in unemployment and inactivity.
In addition to the eects on employment rates, we estimate the eects of the ERA increase on the unemployment rate (Column 2), the fraction of women receiving a disability pension (Column 3), and the fraction of inactive women (Column 4). The unemployment rate and the fraction of women in the inactive category increased signicantly by 5.2 percentage points on average due to the ERA increase. The positive eect on the unemployment rate can be due to either a passive increase in the unemployment rate or an active program substitution from employment into unemployment. The zero eect on disability pension participation rates suggests that there is not program substitution into the disability pension program. i.e. the disability pension program is not used as an alternative pathway to enter retirement.
Our results suggest that the linear trend in month of birth does not aect the outcome on either side of the cuto. Whether or not a woman has children does not aect the outcome signicantly. Women in West Germany are more likely to be employed, to receive a disability pension, or to be inactive, while East German women are more likely to be unemployed. Note that the results do not change if we drop all covariates (see Table 12 Appendix C.5). Including a quadratic function of month of birth does not alter the result considerably (see Table 14 in Appendix C.6). 
Eects across the age prole
In order to shed more light on the eects of an ERA increase on employment outcomes at dierent ages, we interact the entire age prole (in months) with the right hand side of our regression equation. Thereby, we allow for heterogeneous treatment eects by age in months. The resulting coecients by age in months are displayed in Figure 11a to Figure 11d . The results suggest the eect on employment rates of 60 to 62 year old women is positive and increasing with age. The gradual increase after age 60 is due to pre-reform pension entry past age 60. As expected, we can observe a positive eect on unemployment and inactivity rates from age 60 onward due to the elimination of the option to retire early. Our results suggest that the fraction of women receiving a disability pension did not increase for any age-group.
There are several reasons why we expect the ERA increase to have an eect on employment outcomes before the former ERA of 60 (see Section 3). The results of our baseline linear regression analysis on employment outcomes of 58 and 59 year-old women are displayed in Table 5 in Appendix B. As described in Section 3, we expect a decrease in the unemployment rate of 58 to 60 year-old women and an increase in unemployment rates for 61 year-old women, if women are bridging the last 24 months before retirement entry with unemployment benets. However, we do not nd evidence for bridging behavior (Figure 11b) . The pooled regression for women aged 58 and 59, displayed in Table 5 , conrms that there is no signicant increase in unemployment rates for this age group. However, we can see in Figure 11b that there is a small positive eect on the unemployment rate of some age-groups approaching age 60, which is consistent with a reversed reference age eect.
Furthermore, we do not nd evidence for cohort dierences in employment and inactivity rates before age 60, as shown in Figures 11a, and Figure 11d . We conclude that, even though the ERA increase was long anticipated, there was little or no adjustment in labor supply in anticipation of the ERA increase. Notes: The coecients of the treatment dummy interacted with the age prole are estimated using a linear regression model including age xed eects, linear trends in month of birth and the interaction with age in months, calendar month xed eects, income groups, and a dummy for West Germany. Condence intervals of clustered standard errors are displayed using error bars. Source: VSKT 2014, own calculations
Eect heterogeneity by subgroups
In order to understand the impact of the ERA increase, it is necessary to learn more about the group aected by the reform. A comparison of women who retire early with those who retire with 62 or later, displayed in Table 16 in Appendix D, provides insights on the characteristics of the group aected by the pension reform. Women who retire early have fewer pension points on average, i.e. lower average earnings. The sum of pension points, contribution points after age 40, and the total contribution period are also lower for early retirees, which is not surprising due to the shorter working lifetime. Furthermore, women who retire early are more likely to have poor health. Women who retire late are more likely to be employed and less likely to be unemployed when they reach age 60. If women who make use of the early retirement option dier from those working longer, we expect the abolishment of the early pension for women to have heterogeneous eects on dierent subgroups. Therefore, we split our sample into several sub-samples to evaluate whether the reform had heterogeneous eects. In particular, we distinguish between East and West Germany. 20 Furthermore, we distinguish women with low income, poor health and women with and without children. 21 The results for the analysis of dierent subgroups are displayed in Table 2 (and Table 6 in Appendix B for 58-59 year-old women). Women in East Germany are much more likely to be eligible for the woman's pension. Consequently, we nd larger, although not signicantly, employment eects for East Germany than for West Germany. While the reform eect on unemployment rates of 60 and 61 year-old women is negligible in West Germany, there is a large positive eect of about 15 percentage points on the unemployment rate of women in East Germany. This is likely to be due to larger overall unemployment rates in the East. We expect women to suer disproportionately by an ERA increase, if they have a stronger preference to retire early than the average population. Retirement incentives with respect to income groups are not unambiguous due to income and substitution eects. We nd slightly larger eects on employment rates for the sub-group of women with low average earnings. We do not nd a signicant increase in unemployment for this group.
Women with poor health can be expected to have strong preferences for early retirement and inelastic labor supply at high ages. Consequently, we expect women with poor health to shirk into alternative employment-exit paths when the ERA is increased. In particular, we expect larger unemployment rates and an increase in disability pension participation rates. Our results show that the disability pension rates did not increase for any subgroup as a response to the ERA reform. Among women without children, the eect on inactivity rates is larger than for the whole sample including women with children.
Overall, we conclude that the ERA increase aected certain groups heterogeneously. Women in East Germany are more aected than women in the West. In particular, un-West Germany. 21 Low income is dened by the lowest third of the distribution of pension points collected in full contribution periods. Poor health is dened as having at least one sick-pay spell from age 45 to age 55. Note that women who received sick pay are more likely to be employed or unemployed than inactive. Due to data limitations, we cannot divide the sample into married and unmarried women, even though this would be another sub-group analysis of interest. employment rates of 60 to 62 year-old women increase more in East than West Germany. Furthermore, we nd suggestive evidence for slightly higher employment eects for 60 and 61 year-old women with low income, poor health and women without children.
Employment outows and program substitution
The results described in the previous sections suggest that the ERA increase led to increased program substitution into unemployment. Furthermore, we nd evidence for increased inactivity of 60 to 62 year-old women as a response to the reform. This could be caused by passive (women remain in their respective labor market status) or active substitution from employment into unemployment or inactivity because women are not willing or able to work until the new ERA. In order to distinguish between passive and active program substitution, we estimate the eect of the ERA increase on the probability to exit employment (and enter unemployment, disability pension program, or residual category) in a specic age window, conditional on employment for at least 6 months at the start of this window. In particular, we condition on employment for at least 6 months at the 58 th birthday and estimate the eects on the probability to exit employment in the following two and four years. For identication of the treatment eect, we have to assume that employment rates at age 58 are unaected by the reform. A test of discontinuity in the employment rate at the 58 th birthday is displayed in Figure 12 . There is no statistically signicant discontinuity in the employment rate at the cuto. 22 Figure 12 : Test for discontinuity in employment rate at 58 th birthday Notes: The scatter plot displays mean outcome values using monthly bins. The local linear regression plot is based on triangular kernel functions with a bandwidth of 12 months. Source: VSKT2014, own calculations
The results for the employment outow analysis are displayed in Table 3 , where the coecients in the odd columns can be interpreted as the reform eect on the probability to exit/enter the respective category between the 58 th and the 60 th birthday. The coecients in the even columns correspond to the eects on the probability to exit/enter the respective categories in the four years between the 58 th and the 62 nd birthday. We nd a large negative eect of 21 percentage points on the probability to exit employment between age 58 and 62, which is solely due to decreased exit rates between 60 and 62. Furthermore, we nd small positive eects on unemployment, disability pension and inactivity entry rates of 58 and 59 year-old women who were employed at their 58 th birthday. This could be explained by a small reversed reference age eect, i.e. by a lack of entries in these categories in the 1951 cohort. However, the eects are small and only signicant at the 10% level. The lack of any increase in program entry for women aged 60 to 62 suggests that there the ERA increase did not lead to increased active program substitution. 
Conclusion
This paper provides novel insights about the causal eects of pension reforms on labor market outcomes. We exploit a large exogenous increase in the ERA for women. In more detail, we focus on the 1999 pension reform that increased the ERA by at least three years for women born after December 1951. Previous studies show that labor market exits increase signicantly at the pension eligibility age. If women shift their employment exit to the new ERA, it might be an eective tool to increase old-age employment. However, it could imply that some women who are not able to extend their working life are adversely aected by this reform. The estimation is based on high-quality administrative data from the German pension insurance. The sharp discontinuity in the ERA by cohorts allows us to analyze the behavioral responses using a regression discontinuity design. Our results show that employment rates among women between the old and new ERA increased by 14.4 percentage points which corresponds to an increase of about 26% compared to the pre-reform employment rate. Employment rates before age 60 remain unaected by the reform, even though the reform was long anticipated. This is also surprising since previous studies show that earlier cohorts often used unemployment benets as a bridge to retirement.
Furthermore, we nd a positive reform eect on the unemployment and inactivity rates rate of 60 to 62 year-old women, which is caused by passive rather than active program substitution. That is, women who lost the early retirement option remained in their respective labor market status, i.e. in unemployment or inactivity, instead of retiring early. In order to distinguish between passive and active program substitution, we analyze the eects on employment outows, and unemployment and disability pension inows. We do not nd increased unemployment, inactivity or disability pension entry among 60 to 62 year-old women. In other words, unemployed or inactive women did not return on the labor market. Employed women of the 1952 cohort remained in employment.
The ERA increase might have undesired heterogeneous eects as the ability to work long and the remaining life expectancy may depend on socio-economic status. In particular, workers with poor health and weak labor market position might be negatively aected by fewer retirement options. Consequently, we examine whether the behavioral reactions dier by income and health status. We nd women in East Germany are more aected than those in West Germany. In particular, unemployment rates of 60 to 62 year-old women increase more in East than in West Germany. East German women are less likely to be inactive. Furthermore, we nd suggestive evidence for slightly higher employment eects for 60 and 61 year-old women with low income, poor health, and women without children.
The main heterogeneity of the reform eects results from the persistence of labor market statuses. Unemployed or inactive women remained in their respective status. For these women, the time between employment exit and retirement entry was simply extended, and the period of pension benets receipt shortened. This is a large negative wealth shock for this group only partly compensated by lower deductions. Employed women were able to compensate this wealth shock by continuing to work and to increase their pension entitlements. 
A. Pension types
C. Robustness and validity of the empirical strategy
We identied several potential threats to our identication strategy. These are discontinuities in covariates, and the turn of the year eect, and bias due to sample selection. While Section 5 describes our empirical strategy, we address all possible identication threats in greater detail in this section, and check whether our results are robust to several alternative specications of the empirical model.
C.1. Discontinuities in covariates
A main concern for every analysis based on cohort discontinuities is that something other than the policy change of interest is aecting the relevant cohorts. This may lead to discontinuities in covariates that may in turn aect the outcome variables of interest. One way to account for this concern is to check for discontinuities in covariates that should not be aected by the reform. The analysis of outcomes for 58 and 59 year-old women can be interpreted as a test for covariate-discontinuities. However, although these age groups are not directly aected by the reform, they may have adapted their employment behavior in anticipation of the ERA increase. Consequently, it is dicult to nd covariates that are truly unaected by the reform. We compare several time-invariant covariates as average and sum of pension points, health status, number of children, and contribution period by month of birth and do not nd any discontinuities between cohorts. We nd that women who are born after the policy cuto are signicantly less likely to be eligible for the pension for long-term insured individuals, however, this may be due to the fact that the 1951 cohort is older at the point of data collection and therefore more likely to have accumulated the required 35 years of pension contribution years. We refer to dierences between women born at the end of a year in comparison to women who were born at the beginning of a year as turn of the year eect. In particular, there may be discontinuities in labor market outcomes for women born between December and January that are unrelated to the ERA increase reform. In order to address this concern, we performed a dierence-in-discontinuities analysis using the discontinuity between cohorts born in 1950 and 1951 as counterfactual with a hypothetical policy-cuto in the running variable at the turn of the year. The dierence-in-discontinuities estimation is implemented by interacting the regression equation with an indicator function T i , equal to one for the real sample around the actual reform cuto-date, and zero otherwise. The results for 60-61 and 58-59 year-old women are displayed in Table 8 and Table 9 ). Reassuringly, the results are similar to those of the baseline specication presented in Section 6.1. The coecients of the interaction term T i * D i fo not dier signicantly from the corresponding coecients in Tables 1 and 5. We conclude that discontinuities between cohorts can be attributed to the ERA increase and therefore select a standard RD framework as our baseline specication. 
C.3. Sample selection
A major concern arises due to the selection of the sample by the eligibility criteria of the pension for women. Specically, women born in 1951 may select into the sample by prolonging their pension contribution period in order to be eligible for early retirement.
In contrast, women born in 1952 do not have the same incentives to fulll the eligibility criteria. The eligibility criteria for claiming a pension for women are: (i) at least 15 years of pension insurance contributions; and (ii) at least 10 years of pension insurance contributions after the age of 40. Consequently, we expect bunching in the density distribution after 15 contribution years for the 1951 cohort, but not for the 1952 cohort. However, when the reform was introduced in 1999, women born in 1951 and 1952 were already 47-48 years old. At that age, most women have already collected at least 5 contribution years. Therefore, cohorts have dierent incentives primarily with respect to the second eligibility criterion of a contribution period of at least 10 years after age 40. We show in Figure 15 and Figure 17 that there is no bunching: neither after 15 years, nor after 121 contribution months for the 1951 cohort, when compared to the 1952 cohort. Seibold (2016) also looks at bunching in pension contribution years and nds only little bunching at the relevant cutos for women. Furthermore, we test for a discontinuity (1) in the fraction of women fullling the eligibility criteria for early retirement, (2) the number of contribution years, (3) the number of contribution months after age 40, (4) eligibility for the old-age pension for the long term insured, and (5) the sum of years worked up to age 60. We nd that there is no signicant discontinuity at the cohort-cuto. The corresponding local linear and local polynomial regression plots for the fraction of women fullling the eligibility criteria are displayed in Figure 19 . We conclude that bias due to sample selection is negligible. Figure 15 : Distribution of contribution years by cohort (a) 
